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Social Mechanisms and Political Economy: When Pollsters Fail and Lobbyists Succeed

Open Book Publishers
Forthcoming
Social Mechanisms and Political Economy: When Pollsters Fail and Lobbyists Succeed
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Metadata
TitleSocial Mechanisms and Political Economy
SubtitleWhen Pollsters Fail and Lobbyists Succeed
ContributorDavid K. Levine (author)
Andrea Mattozzi(opens in new tab)(author)
Salvatore Modica (author)
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0577(opens in new tab)
Landing pagehttps://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/OBP.0577(opens in new tab)
Licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/(opens in new tab)
CopyrightDavid K. Levine; Andrea Mattozzi; Salvatore Modica
PublisherOpen Book Publishers
Publication placeCambridge, UK
ISBN978-1-80789-105-3 (Paperback)
978-1-80789-106-0 (Hardback)
978-1-80789-107-7 (PDF)
978-1-80789-109-1 (HTML)
978-1-80789-108-4 (EPUB)
Long abstract

Large interest groups often prevail in democratic elections yet lose influence to smaller, more organised groups in lobbying. Social networks, peer pressure and economic incentives play a crucial role in shaping political participation, collective action and the rise of populism.This book offers a systematic framework for understanding group behaviour and political outcomes. Bringing together economics and sociology, it develops new theoretical tools to explain how individuals respond to incentives, interact within social networks and organise to pursue shared political objectives.Combining game theory, incentive constraints and auction theory with sociological perspectives on group behaviour, David K. Levine, Andrea Mattozzi and Salvatore Modica investigate the mechanisms underlying democratic competition and political influence. They examine the contrasting fortunes of large and small interest groups, the effectiveness of lobbying, voter turnout and the conditions contributing to populist success.The analysis demonstrates how economic fundamentals interact with social structures to produce political outcomes that conventional models may struggle to explain. In doing so the authors offer a distinctive approach to political economy, democratic theory and collective action.Written for advanced undergraduate and graduate students, and researchers in economics, political science and sociology, this volume provides an introduction to a rigorous theoretical framework for understanding contemporary democracy and organised political influence.

LanguageEnglish (Original)
THEMA
  • JP
  • KCP
  • JPH
  • JHB
  • KCA
BISAC
  • POL000000
  • POL023000
  • BUS069000
  • SOC026000
Keywords
  • Political Economy
  • Collective Action
  • Interest Groups
  • Lobbying
  • Social Networks
  • Populism

Contributors

David K. Levine

(author)
Leverhulme International Professor of Economics at Royal Holloway, University of London(opens in new tab)
John H. Biggs Distinguished Professor Emeritus in Economics at Washington University in St. Louis(opens in new tab)

Salvatore Modica

(author)
Professor of Economics at University of Palermo(opens in new tab)