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Models in Political Economy: Collective Choice, Voting, Elections, Bargaining, and Rebellion

Open Book Publishers
2025-09-12
Models in Political Economy: Collective Choice, Voting, Elections, Bargaining, and Rebellion
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Metadata
TitleModels in Political Economy
SubtitleCollective Choice, Voting, Elections, Bargaining, and Rebellion
ContributorMartin J. Osborne(opens in new tab)(author)
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0490(opens in new tab)
Landing pagehttps://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/OBP.0490(opens in new tab)
Licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/(opens in new tab)
CopyrightMartin J. Osborne
PublisherOpen Book Publishers
Publication placeCambridge, UK
Published on2025-09-12
ISBN978-1-80511-706-3 (Paperback)
978-1-80511-707-0 (Hardback)
978-1-80511-708-7 (PDF)
Short abstract

This volume explores topics that lie at the core of political economy: collective choice, voting, elections, bargaining, and rebellion. It presents the main formal models used to study the behavior of individuals and groups in political contexts, from choosing public policies and participating as voters and candidates in elections, to staging revolutions. Complete mathematical proofs are provided, to clarify the assumptions and deepen understanding.

Long abstract

This volume explores topics that lie at the core of political economy: collective choice, voting, elections, bargaining, and rebellion. It presents the main formal models used to study the behavior of individuals and groups in political contexts, from choosing public policies and participating as voters and candidates in elections, to staging revolutions. Complete mathematical proofs are provided, to clarify the assumptions and deepen understanding.

Part I presents models of collective choice. The main question is whether methods exist for selecting a reasonable compromise when individuals’ preferences differ. Models of voting are studied in Part II. Included are models in which the individuals differ in their preferences as well as ones in which they differ in their information. One chapter considers the implications of individuals having ethical concerns, and another studies a model of sequential voting. Models of electoral competition, under the assumption of various motivations for the candidates, are discussed in Part III. One chapter is devoted to the application of these models to the study of redistributive policy. The book concludes with Part IV, which covers models of bargaining and rebellion.

The book offers a rigorous yet accessible foundation for understanding how formal tools can illuminate political phenomena.

Print length552 pages (xvii+534)
LanguageEnglish (Original)
Dimensions203 x 38 x 254 mm | 7.99" x 1.50" x 10" (Paperback)
203 x 41 x 254 mm | 7.99" x 1.61" x 10" (Hardback)
Weight1465g | 51.68oz (Paperback)
1715g | 60.49oz (Hardback)
OCLC Number1537554285
LCCN2025474131
THEMA
  • JPQB
  • JPHV
  • JPH
  • KCA
  • GPQ
BISAC
  • POL023000
  • POL016000
  • POL024000
  • POL003000
  • SOC024000
  • MAT011000
LCC
  • JA72
Keywords
  • Political economy
  • Formal models
  • Game theory
  • Collective choice
  • Voting theory
  • Electoral competition

Contents

  1. Collective choice with known preferences
(pp. 3–70)
  • Martin J. Osborne
  1. Collective choice with privately-known preferences
(pp. 71–88)
  • Martin J. Osborne
  1. Voting with two alternatives
(pp. 91–118)
  • Martin J. Osborne
  1. Voting with many alternatives: plurality rule
(pp. 119–142)
  • Martin J. Osborne
  1. Sequential pairwise voting
(pp. 143–174)
  • Martin J. Osborne
  1. Ethical voting and expressive voting
(pp. 175–182)
  • Martin J. Osborne
  1. Voting with asymmetric information
(pp. 183–218)
  • Martin J. Osborne
  1. Electoral competition: two office-motivated candidates
(pp. 221–268)
  • Martin J. Osborne
  1. Electoral competition: two policy-motivated candidates
(pp. 269–300)
  • Martin J. Osborne
  1. Electoral competition: endogenous candidates
(pp. 301–338)
  • Martin J. Osborne
  1. Distributive politics
(pp. 339–372)
  • Martin J. Osborne
  1. Money in electoral competition
(pp. 373–396)
  • Martin J. Osborne
  1. Two-period electoral competition with imperfect information
(pp. 397–418)
  • Martin J. Osborne
  1. Bargaining
(pp. 421–452)
  • Martin J. Osborne
  1. Regime change
(pp. 453–482)
  • Martin J. Osborne
  1. Preferences, profiles, games, and optimization
(pp. 485–512)
  • Martin J. Osborne
Locations
PaperbackLanding page(opens in new tab)Full text URL(opens in new tab)Publisher Website
HardbackLanding page(opens in new tab)Full text URL(opens in new tab)Publisher Website
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Landing page(opens in new tab)Full text URL(opens in new tab)OAPEN
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Landing page(opens in new tab)Full text URL(opens in new tab)
Landing page(opens in new tab)Full text URL(opens in new tab)INTERNET ARCHIVE
Landing page(opens in new tab)Full text URL(opens in new tab)Publisher Website
Landing page(opens in new tab)Full text URL(opens in new tab)ZENODO

Contributors