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Models in Microeconomic Theory ('He' Edition)

Open Book Publishers
2020-03-27
Models in Microeconomic Theory ('He' Edition)
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TitleModels in Microeconomic Theory ('He' Edition)
ContributorMartin J. Osborne(opens in new tab)(author)
Ariel Rubinstein(opens in new tab)(author)
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0204(opens in new tab)
Landing pagehttps://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0204(opens in new tab)
Licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/(opens in new tab)
CopyrightMartin J. Osborne; Ariel Rubinstein
PublisherOpen Book Publishers
Publication placeCambridge, UK
Published on2020-03-27
ISBN978-1-78374-920-1 (Paperback)
978-1-78374-921-8 (Hardback)
978-1-78374-922-5 (PDF)
Short abstract

Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. The book focuses on the concepts of model and equilibrium. It states models and results precisely, and provides proofs for all results. It uses only elementary mathematics (with almost no calculus), although many of the proofs involve sustained logical arguments. It includes about 150 exercises.

Long abstract

Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. Part I (Chapters 1-7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium, beginning, unconventionally, with the models of the jungle and an economy with indivisible goods, and continuing with models of an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III (Chapters 15-16) provides an introduction to game theory, covering strategic and extensive games and the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching, the axiomatic analysis of economic systems, and social choice.

The book focuses on the concepts of model and equilibrium. It states models and results precisely, and provides proofs for all results. It uses only elementary mathematics (with almost no calculus), although many of the proofs involve sustained logical arguments. It includes about 150 exercises.

With its formal but accessible style, this textbook is designed for undergraduate students of microeconomics at intermediate and advanced levels.

Print length362 pages (xviii+344)
LanguageEnglish (Original)
Dimensions203 x 25 x 254 mm | 8" x 0.99" x 10" (Paperback)
203 x 29 x 254 mm | 8" x 1.13" x 10" (Hardback)
Weight2141g | 75.52oz (Paperback)
2690g | 94.89oz (Hardback)
OCLC Number1148094465
LCCN2019452876
BIC
  • KCA
  • JHBC
  • K
BISAC
  • BUS044000
  • BUS069030
LCC
  • HB172
Keywords
  • microeconomic theory
  • basic models
  • models of an economic agent
  • equilibrium
  • game theory
  • mechanism design
  • matching
  • axiomatic analysis of economic systems
  • social choice
  • undergraduate students
  • microeconomics

Contents

Preferences and utility(pp. 3–16)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
Choice(pp. 17–30)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
Preferences under uncertainty(pp. 31–44)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
Consumer preferences(pp. 45–56)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
Consumer behavior(pp. 57–74)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
Producer behavior(pp. 75–88)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
Monopoly(pp. 89–102)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
A jungle(pp. 105–120)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
A market(pp. 121–136)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
An exchange economy(pp. 137–156)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
Variants of an exchange economy(pp. 157–174)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
A market with consumers and producers(pp. 175–186)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
Equilibrium with prices and expectations(pp. 187–202)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
A market with asymmetric information(pp. 203–214)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
Strategic games(pp. 217–248)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
Extensive games(pp. 249–278)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
Mechanism design(pp. 281–288)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
Matching(pp. 289–300)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
Socialism(pp. 301–312)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein
Aggregating preferences(pp. 313–328)
  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein